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ABSTRACT 
Transparent password policies are utilized by organizations in an effort to 
ease the end-user (e.g. customer) from the burden of configuring 
authentication settings while maintaining a high level of security. However, 
authentication transparency can challenge security and usability and can 
impact the awareness of the end-users with regards to the protection level 
that is realistically achieved. For authentication transparency to be effective, 
the triptych security – usability – situational awareness should be considered 
when designing relevant security solutions / products. Although various 
efforts have been made in the literature, the usability aspects of the 
password selection process are not well understood or addressed in the 
context of end-user situational awareness. This research work specifies three 
security and usability-related strategies that represent the organizations’, the 
end users’ and the attackers’ objectives with regards to password 
construction. Understanding each actor’s perspective can greatly assist in 
increasing situational awareness with regards to the authentication controls 
usage and effectiveness. Furthermore, a case study is presented to evaluate 
if, and in what way, transparent password policies, that isolate users’ 
involvement can affect the perspective of the end-user with regards to the 
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security situation. Results showed that the transparent approached utilized 
has created a negative situation, users were not aware and never dealt with 
changing or trying to alter default security settings configured on their 
wireless access point, leaving their home network vulnerable to external 
attacks. Finally, initial recommendations are made to organizations that 
would like to implement and evaluate transparent authentication controls.   
 
Keyword: Transparent security; transparent password policy; password 
cracking; usable security; end-user cyber situational awareness.    
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
One of the most challenging aspects of information security is user 
authentication (Payne and Edwards, 2008). Users utilize passwords in 
everyday life to access their accounts and support their activities. Although 
user authentication is a topic well studied, the practice of using passwords as 
a means of providing identity is challenging security and usability design 
aspects (Flechais, Mascolo and Sasse, 2007) and can hinder situational 
awareness (Barford et al., 2009). Authentication controls such as password 
creation policies, try to balance between strong security (which dictates 
more diverse passwords that are not easily cracked) and usability of 
authentication mechanisms (relating to the ease of use and memorability of 
passwords). Assessing if authentication controls can successfully balance 
security and usability can lead individuals and organizations to predict and 
respond to potential threats that might arise. By identifying vulnerabilities 
relevant to authentication controls and by anticipating relevant threats, we 
can increase situational awareness and empower end-users and 
organizations to develop effective countermeasures.  
 
Authentication mechanisms, and particularly password utilization, combines 
both technical and human factors. From a technical perspective, appropriate 
password policies are utilized to drive the construction and implementation 
of strong passwords. The human factor (Sasse and Flechais, 2005) plays a 
crucial role in user authentication. Often, the human factor is considered the 
weakest link with regards to security and password creation. If users are 
allowed to create their own passwords, this could lead to weak passwords. 
Easily guessable passwords constitute a vulnerability that can be exploited 
by malicious people to gain unauthorised access to a system and relevant 
resources. This vulnerability could occur due to reasons such as users’ lack 
of awareness and training or because convenience (e.g. short and easy to 
remember passwords) is chosen over security.  
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Many organizations address the aforementioned problem by designing 
services/products that utilize transparent security policies (Shay, 2016) in an 
effort to prevent end users, e.g. customers, from choosing weak passwords. 
Therefore, the organizations produce the password and provide it to the end 
user, often without the possibility for the user to change the password. With 
this approach, the user is isolated in an effort to ensure that the security 
policy is always applied to meet the expected security requirements. 
Transparent security may be desirable by users, especially by those who are 
not familiar, for example, with the security settings of a product that need to 
be configured to protect its operation and data. Transparency could promote 
usability as the user is not troubled with security aspects he/she may not be 
familiar with. However, one should consider that transparent security could 
also lead to vulnerabilities. Transparent security could greatly impact the 
end-user understanding of the situation by creating a false sense of security, 
as users could rely on good faith upon the organization to achieve the 
desirable level of security. Therefore, it is imperative to evaluate transparent 
security controls, identify negative situations and address them accordingly 
in a timely manner before attackers have the chance to identify and exploit 
vulnerabilities.   
 
The objective of this research work is to: a) specify usability and security 
related strategies with regards to the password construction process, b) 
investigate through a case study if, and in what way, transparent password 
policies utilized by wireless access points (that isolate end users’ 
involvement) can hinder situational awareness, and c) provide 
recommendations to increase situational awareness through transparent 
password policies. Section 2 discusses related work. Section 3 specifies 
appropriate usability and security related strategies with regards to the 
password construction process. Section 4 presents the case study and section 
5 provides recommendations related to the design and assessment of 
transparent authentication controls. Section 6 constitutes conclusions.  
 
2 RELATED WORK 
Wireless networks, while being very popular and accessible, face a variety 
of security challenges. Zou et al. (Zou, Wang and Hanzo, 2015) explain how 
an intruder in the wireless medium can penetrate the network without 
“breaking in the building” as he would in a wired network, by remotely 
attacking from a distance. Waliullah et al. (Waliullah, Moniruzzaman, and 
Rahman, 2015) point out that the wireless medium, due to its open nature 
and long coverage of areas, can become the only target by outsiders because 
it is hardly traceable by authorities. So attackers remain invisible. Wireless 
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signal transmissions can be intercepted, and different techniques are able to 
perform attacks capable to collect and analyze sensitive data which can 
cause severe loses to companies and users (Solms and Marais, 2004). 
Jiantao et al. (Jiantao, Jinghong  and Tao, 2012) explain how some of these 
attacks are feasible on the existing wireless security protocols, considering 
the data link MAC layer of the OSI model where beacons are transmitted 
with no encryption, leaving attackers the ability to spoof or sniff radio 
signals. To mitigate these issues, cryptographic protocols were introduced to 
encrypt data communication in the WLAN such as WEP, WPA and WPA2 
encryption (Kumar and Gambhir, 2014). Even though these protocols added 
a layer of encryption, they failed to remain invulnerable with WEP 
encryption being the weakest and now obsolete (Naamany, Shidhani, and 
Bourdoucen, 2006). WPA and WPA2 protocols provide a greater level of 
protection and are widely used by all networking vendors today.  However, 
some vulnerabilities have been discovered for WPA and WPA2. These 
vulnerabilities relate to offline dictionary attacks, allowing an attacker to try 
different key combinations from a list of words in order to find the correct 
wireless network authentication key (Lashkari, Danesh and Samadi,, 2009). 
This attack utilizes the authentication information collected from the four-
way handshake used for the initial communication of the client with the 
access point. The four-way handshake packet, once collected by an attacker, 
can be brute forced to match the authentication key of the wireless access 
point. Since it is an offline attack, this means that it can be performed in any 
location without the need to be close to the access point (Hytnen and Garcia, 
2006). Depending on the authentication key complexity and length, a brute 
force or dictionary attack can be successful if only the password is weak and 
not configured correctly. If the key is found, then the attacker has access to 
the wireless network unless additional security measures, such as MAC 
filtering, are applied. It is crucial then for networking manufacturers and 
Internet service providers to ensure the devices are secured by default with 
all important security protocols preconfigured (Loo, 2008). More recently, 
another vulnerability related to WP2 was demonstrated by (Vanhoef and 
Piessens, 2017). The authors demonstrated the key reinstallation attack. This 
attack abuses design or implementation flaws in cryptographic protocols to 
reinstall an already-in-use key. This resets the key’s associated parameters 
such as transmit nonces and receive replay counters. By forcing nonce reuse 
in this manner, the data-confidentiality protocol can be attacked, e.g., 
packets can be replayed, decrypted, and/or forged. 
 
Another important issue that needs to be taken into consideration when 
securing a network is users’ usability (Ho, Dearman and Truong, 2010). Bly 
et al. (Bly et al, 2006) identified that non-tech savvy users have difficulties 
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or are unable to understand the security principles. (Durbin, 2011) showed 
the importance of users’ awareness and attitude for correctly configuring the 
security of their networks and computers due to the increased reliance on the 
internet (Arachchilage and Love, 2014). Previous studies as in (Sheng et al, 
2006) demonstrated that users might become victims if they are unable to 
use the security features properly. Some solutions focusing on the users 
were then proposed by researches. (Calvert, Edwards and Grinter, 2007) 
proposed a self-configuring home network with no interaction of users able 
to secure it-self and administer automatically. As mentioned in (Furnell, 
2005), transparent security overcomes irresponsible users’ actions. 
However, even if transparent security solutions can solve some of the issues 
related to the users, they usually do not help with user security situational 
awareness. (Whalen and Inkpen, 2005) identified transparent security as a 
weakness because users were not aware if they were at risk or secure at the 
end. A trade-off between these usability studies was proposed in (Ho, 
Dearman and Truong, 2010). Ho et al. (Ho, Dearman and Truong, 2010) 
suggested a guided initial configuration wizard of the wireless access point 
when first powered up, helping the users making the most secure choices 
and explain at the same time which security protocols and features to 
enable. By using this method, home users get the information needed on 
best security practices and understand the basic secure configurations. 
(Shay, 2016) has focused on constructing different password-composition 
policies and evaluating which have been more usable and secure. They have 
observed that by forcing users to break their password construction habits, 
they made the password selection process more difficult but have also 
achieved the creation of stronger passwords. 
 
3 PASSWORD CONSTRUCTION: SECURITY VS 
USABILITY STRATEGIES 
Password utilization (Payne and Edwards, 2008) is a typical authentication 
method, with the achievable security level highly depended on the password 
construction policy. For the password construction process to be effective, 
both security and users’ usability aspects should be considered. 
 
In terms of security, it is desirable to prohibit attackers from easily cracking 
passwords. There are a variety of tools, e.g. John the Ripper, HashCat, 
AirCrack, etc., that can attempt to crack users’ passwords. Typically, a 
dictionary or a brute force attack is launched against users’ passwords. A 
dictionary attack considers wordlists that contain predefined words, often 
mangled based on a variety of rules to create even more possible passwords. 
A brute force attack considers all possible combinations of characters, 
 6 
numbers and symbols, thus it could be a very time consuming process 
compared to the dictionary attack. From an organization’s point of view, 
constructing diverse, random passwords of minimum 8 characters, mixing 
upper case and lower case characters, numbers and symbols, could decrease 
the possibility of account compromisation (Payne and Edwards, 2008). 
Therefore, a high security level can be achieved. From an attacker’s 
perspective, a low security level is desirable that can be achieved by either a 
non-restrictive password policy or due to bad password construction 
practices followed by the end users. Finally, the security level that is 
pursued by end users typically depends on their level of security awareness 
and training. 
 
In terms of usability, there are also different strategies depending on the 
objectives pursued by organizations, end users and attackers. The usability 
strategy of the user mainly considers constructing passwords that are 
memorable so they can be easily recalled and used. On the other hand, the 
usability strategy of the attacker considers making the password cracking 
process more efficient by decreasing the password-creation space. To 
achieve this, the attacker relies on the fact that users focus more on their 
convenience and the memorability of their password than the underlying 
security that can be achieved. Therefore, the attacker hopes for the users to 
produce passwords that are easily remembered and potentially easily 
cracked. Furthermore, in terms of usability, the attacker relies on various 
user-related error-prone conditions to increase the efficiency of the 
password cracking process, e.g. write down a difficult to remember 
password, use personal information that can be obtained through social 
engineering attacks, etc. Another user-related usability aspect that is of 
interest to the attacker is the learnability of good password construction 
policies. If user learnability is low, there is a higher possibility for user 
errors to occur.  
 
In an effort to address the usability strategies of both the end users and the 
attackers, organizations focus on a different set of usability aspects and 
promote transparent password construction policies. Transparency means 
that the interaction with the password construction process is low, even 
avoided, and the visibility of the password construction policy is obscured. 
The organizations’ aim is to minimize the users’ errors, e.g. bad password 
construction practices, and the attackers’ efficiency of the password 
cracking process. However, by doing so, they remove the users’ (e.g. 
customers’) control and freedom to manage their passwords, including the 
ability to change it. Of course, the successfulness of the transparent 
password policies highly depends on the ability of the organization to 
 7 
balance usability and security for its users. If it is not well balanced, user 
errors could still happen, e.g. write down the password. Another important 
aspect that needs to be considered with transparent security is users’ 
expectations. Users can consider that the organisation has alleviated the 
burden of security configurations from their shoulders, and now they rely 
entirely on the transparent services to achieve the desirable security level. 
This creates a false sense of security on behalf of the end users that do not 
feel the need to investigate any further and setup their security 
configurations. However, end users should consider the possibility of 
vulnerabilities caused by the organizations’ actions. The following section 
presents a case study, considering an existing transparent password policy 
and investigates how situational awareness may be affected. 
 
4 CASE STUDY 
This section presents a case study, investigating whether, and how, 
transparent authentication controls can affect situational awareness, 
especially from the end-user perspective. The case study involves testing the 
security of a wireless access point, from a specific Company, that utilizes a 
transparent password policy, where end users’ (customers’) involvement has 
been isolated. 
 
4.1 Initial observations 
The investigations have started when an initial gathering of passwords from 
some end-users who had acquired the same type wireless device from the 
Company had led to the following observations: 
- The password length was 8 characters long 
- The password was constructed using only hexadecimal characters [A-F] 
and [0-9] 
Also, it worth mentioning that the Company did not allow the end-users to 
change the password (devices have been shipped with a predefined 
password) and that very recently it provided this feature through a web 
portal. 
 
4.2 Case study design 
Initially, all participants provided their consent for the practical testing to be 
conducted against their wireless device at their house premises.  A laptop 
with a built in wireless card able to monitor the wireless signals in monitor 
mode was required to perform the test. The test was comprised of two attack 
attempts. For the first attempt, the client was legitimately connected and the 
attack was performed. If the attack was successful then the information such 
as password, required time or any other comments was collected. In the 
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second attack, the laptop was legitimately trying to connect to the wireless 
network. If it required an extensive time to conclude, it was left at the house 
overnight and collected the next day to view the results. 
 
4.3 Methodology 
The initial stage was to collect as many passwords from customers (of the 
particular Company) as possible to identify if there are any relations 
between: the SSID (Service Set Identifier or WiFi name of the device), 
MAC address of the wireless device and the wireless password.  After 
extensive review an observation had been made. The MAC address of the 
device had something in common with the wireless password. The wireless 
password as noted earlier consisted of 8 characters in length, using only 
hexadecimal characters, thus 0-9 and A-F, in the form of “112213A4”. What 
was noticed is that the 5th and 6th character of the password was the same 
as the device MAC address 9th and 10th digit. For example, in the password 
“112213A4”, part “13” was the same as the MAC address 
11:22:33:44:13:AF, which 9th and 10th digit is “13”. This was considered a 
good starting point as it applied to every password gathered in the initial 
stage. Another observation was that the first 4 characters of the password 
were always numbers (0-9). For example, the passwords started with 
2354XXXX or 7698XXXX. That was a very promising discovery because, 
if that was true, that meant that a dictionary could be created containing all 
possible combinations for passwords with the first four characters being 
numbers and the last four containing all hexadecimal characters. This would 
allow an attack such as the four-way handshake to collect the password and 
test it against the dictionary list. With a decent computational power 
calculating around 2000 keys per second, that would require around 3 days 
to find the key, always considering that the list contains the correct key 
otherwise the process will fail. Further in the review process, something else 
was noticed. Sometimes the 6th, 7th and 8th character of the password was 
changing and did not match the first observation that the 5th and 6th 
character matched the MAC address. For example, consider the password 
“1122A4FD” with the respective MAC address 11:22:33:44:A5:05. After 
extensive review of this password, another theory emerged. If the last digit 
of the MAC address in the 12th position was below number 8 (<8), the 
character was somehow changing in those positions. For example, if the 
MAC address was 11:22:33:44:AE:48 then the password would be 
“XXXXAE40”, and only the last digit changed. But if the MAC address was 
11:22:33:44:AE:40, then the password was different “XXXXAE38”. If the 
MAC address was in this form 11:22:33:44:A4:04, with 0 in the 11th digit 
position and lower than number 8 in the last 12th position digit, then the 
password was changing all last 3 digits “XXXXA3FC”. With these 
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observations in mind, the last digits once converted in binary values from 
hexadecimal characters (0 and 1), made some sense. In the example with 
MAC “AE:48”, the password became “AE40” and the difference was MAC 
last digit – 8. In the second example where MAC was “AE:40”, the 
password became “AE38” and the third example with MAC “A4:04” the 
password became “A3FC”. If the difference of MAC – 8 still applies in the 
last two examples, then there is some consistence if the hexadecimal 
character is converted to binary value or decimal number as shown in Figure 
1. In that case, the decimal number 10 represents the hexadecimal character 
“A”, the decimal number “11” represents the hexadecimal character “B” and 
so on until the last character which is “F” maps to the decimal number 15. 
So in the end, the theory of MAC address – 8 at the last digit is correct. As 
shown in Figure 1, the hexadecimal characters are represented by decimal 
numbers in the form of numbers [0-15]. If the last example is considered 
where the MAC “A4:04” became the password “A3FC”, the MAC’s last 
digit 4 – 8 = -4 which is represented by hexadecimal character C, since with 
the subtraction value 0 was passed (going minus value), then there is a 
subtraction of 1 in the 6th and 7th password digit. So from 40 – 1 = 3F 
because F is the last character before moving to zero. A MAC address can 
be in the form of 00:00:00:00:00:00 to FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF. Second 
example was MAC “AE:40” that became password “AE38” so the theory is 
still consistent with 0 – 8 = -8 (hexadecimal character 8) and since the zero 
number was passed there is another subtraction of E4 – 1 = E3. 
 
Figure 1. Hexadecimal characters representation in decimal and binary 
values. 
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By using this theory, all gathered MAC addresses were converted to 
passwords and matched the last four characters of the password correctly. In 
this way the last four characters of the wireless password could be 
calculated by only having the MAC address of the wireless device which 
can be easily viewed by any software able to visualize the wireless access 
points. This discovery leaves the first four characters to be calculated which 
as discussed before they were observed to only contain numeric characters 
[0-9]. Considering this then the possible range of any access point password 
is: 0000XXXX – 9999XXXX. There are then 10000 possibilities or 
otherwise 10000 passwords contained in a list to be compared with the four-
way handshake containing the correct wireless password. If a decent modern 
computer can calculate 2000 keys per second, then only 5 seconds are 
required to find the correct key (assuming that the four-way handshake 
packet is gathered).  
 
With this information collected, the password strength of any wireless 
access point of the Company is considered very weak. For confirming the 
experiment, the practical part had to be done by simulating an attacker 
trying to penetrate the network.  Since the Company used WPA2 
encryption, the only method for finding the wireless password was to 
perform the Denial of Service attack to collect the four-way handshake and 
compare it against the dictionary list. Since the password was weak and 
there were only 10000 possibilities, another way of attacking these wireless 
networks was feasible. If an application went over all possibilities in the 
dictionary against the wireless access point directly, without the need to 
collect the four-way handshake, that would eliminate the need to wait for a 
legitimate client to connect to the access point allowing to perform the 
attack anytime. By using this theory, a bash script was created in Linux 
which reads all lines of the dictionary one by one and tried to connect to the 
access point like any other normal device would in the process to connect to 
a wireless network. This method, compared to the normal attack via four-
way handshake, will require significant amount of time due to the limitation 
of the wpa_supplicant client which was used to perform the connection 
operations and required around five seconds for each key inside the 
dictionary (5*10000 = 50000 seconds, 13.8 hours). If the wpa_supplicant 
connection was successful, then the application stopped, and the correct key 
was presented. For speeding up the process two laptops were used, one 
starting from 0000XXXX towards 9999XXXX and one starting from 
9999XXXX towards 0000XXXX. 
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4.4. Discussion 
For the first experiment two practical tests were performed, one using the 
traditional WPA dictionary vulnerability and another one using only a 
dictionary and an automatic script which tries to connect legitimately to the 
wireless access point. Both tests were successful with the sample used. 
Approximately in 65% of the cases, the participants’ networks were 
accessible by using the four-way handshake dictionary attack within 
minutes (since the clients were connected and present) and the rest 35% of 
the cases the networks were accessible by using the automated method 
which required around 7 to 10 hours to complete. This finding raises a 
danger in the security strength of the customers’ wireless networks. An 
attacker finding its way inside the network might continue to perform credit 
card stealing, impersonation, data stealing attacks, etc., which can cause 
serious issues. As it has been observed throughout the experiment, 
participants lacked security awareness and had difficulties understanding the 
relevant security issues. Also, 85% of the users weren’t aware of the new 
feature provided by the Company that permitted them to change their 
password. As a result, they have left the default security configurations 
(transparent security). We would also like to mention that due to 
confidential information issues, the name of the organization and the actual 
passwords discovered cannot be revealed. 
 
The case study demonstrated that it is challenging to design effective 
transparent password policies that can balance security and usability while 
empowering the end-user (customer) to maintain a good level of awareness. 
It is widely recognized that end-users represent the weakest link in the 
cybersecurity chain. Increasing end-users cyber situational awareness is 
imperative to successfully address cyber threats. The research community 
should investigate further how transparency in security can affect situational 
awareness and propose measures to balance the triptych security – usability 
– situational awareness.  The following section provides initial 
recommendations related to the design and assessment of transparent 
authentication controls. 
 
4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Usability is often set aside when designing security solutions. Even if a 
highly secure system is developed, if user usability is not taken into 
consideration, then users will probably try to find ways to increase their 
convenience, having a negative impact on the overall security effectiveness. 
Transparent security has been proposed to address the tradeoff between 
security and usability. The challenge when working behind the scenes is to 
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simplify things, reduce configurability while at the same time provide to the 
users the means to understand the situation and control the security of their 
systems. As confirmed by the case study, it is a bad practice to remove 
entirely the control from the end user when it comes to configuring the 
security of their wireless networks. The best approach to apply, in an effort 
to balance usability – security - awareness, is to implement understandable 
security solutions that are easy to manage by the novice users. In the context 
of novice users, understandable security would mean to provide high level 
security information, focusing on key technical terms only, so that the users 
will be able to realize easily the related security concepts and select the 
appropriate configurations. Implementing a wizard to guide end users 
through the configuration process is a good approach and organizations 
should consider it more actively. Moreover, since transparent security often 
means that the end users will overlook security since they consider that it is 
already configured, the application should force the users to interact (at least 
once) with the configuration options. This way the users are made aware of 
the existence of the configurations and also are given the opportunity to 
investigate them further, if they want to.   Organizations should also make 
sure to communicate to their users, new security features and provide 
support through different channels (e.g. email announcements, forums, 
training videos, etc.) in an effort to meet the requirements of both novice 
and expert users. Furthermore, transparent password policies should be 
constructed taking into consideration users’ expectation, memorability, 
learnability, freedom and error avoidance (avoid bad practices). Finally, 
appropriate tools (Stavrou, 2017) need to be developed that can evaluate the 
level of protection that can be established through the transparent policies. 
 
5 CONCLUSION 
Transparent security is one way to ease users, especially novice ones, from 
the burden of security configurations. Implementing transparency on 
password construction and utilization policies is challenging, as the tradeoff 
between usability and security has to be balanced in order to promote an 
effective authentication solution and end-user situational awareness. Human 
factors play a significant role in the tradeoff that occurs between usability 
and security and organizations should consider these factors in order to 
achieve usable and understandable security. This case study proofed that 
transparent password policies are indeed challenging and could lead to 
vulnerabilities that can be exploited by attackers. The Company’s 
regulations, to have full transparent security, affected negatively the 
awareness of end-users and the overall security of the wireless networks.  
To achieve effective security and end-user awareness, both security experts 
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and end users need to take into consideration each other’s security 
requirements. It is important for security experts to have an understanding of 
how people will interact with the systems they develop and with the 
configurations they setup, and develop solutions that will be understandable 
and not burdensome the end user. On the other hand, end users should be 
security aware and try to make good security decisions. As a future work, 
authors are planning to extend the presented investigations and provide 
more recommendations as to the construction and utilization of transparent 
password policies. 
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KEY TERMS 
 
- Transparent security – The implemented security is not visible to the end-
users. 
- Transparent password policy – A password policy that is not visible to the 
end user.  
- Password cracking – A process to evaluate if a password can be recovered. 
- Usable security – Solutions that assist users to perform their tasks securely, 
in an effective and efficient manner. 
- End-user cyber situational awareness – The perception of the end-user 
with regards to a cybersecurity issue. 
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